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By 2030 the U.S. will lose around $520 billion annually from its gross
domestic product due to flooding. New risks resulting from climate change arise
not only from swelling rivers and lakes, but also from stormwater runoff. Accord-
ing to the World Bank, coastal cities risk flooding more from their poor manage-
ment of surface water than they do from rising sea levels.
Surface water liability governs when a landowner is responsible for divert-
ing the flow of water to a neighboring parcel of land. Steep increases in urban
flooding will make surface water an enormous source of litigation in the coming
decades. But surface water jurisprudence is ill equipped for this influx. The law of
surface waters remains cumbersome, antiquated, and confusing. Furthermore, the
doctrine itself has exacerbated the problem by privileging land development over
maintaining natural landscapes, thereby eliminating what would have been car-
bon sequestration devices, as well as natural buffers against storm surges, sea level
rise, and flooding.
This Article critiques surface water liability rules through original research
into the agricultural science that supported these legal doctrines. By establishing
how the current legal doctrines emerged from science now known to be highly
flawed, this Article demonstrates the need to break with past doctrines and engage
in a genuine rethinking of how to manage surface water liability in the twenty-
first century. Finally, this Article proposes a new liability rule that would manage
landowner expectations while avoiding the pro-development bias currently en-
trenched in the jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
In March of 2015, Scientific American estimated that the number of peo-
ple worldwide who will be affected by flooding from rainfall each year will
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rise to 54 million per year by 2030.1 Researchers at the World Resources
Institute estimate that flooding currently costs around $96 billion in gross
domestic product worldwide; in 2030, that number rises to $520 billion per
year.2
The problem is not just extreme rain or snowfall. The rapid expansion
of urban areas, combined with extreme precipitation, doubles flood risks.3
These new risks arise not from swelling rivers and lakes, but from
stormwater runoff. Urban construction, including changes to elevations of
lots, paving, and building prevent natural absorption of water and channel it
into lower-lying areas.
Because flooding is the most frequent natural catastrophe,4 the topics of
flooding and sea level rise have dominated discussions about water and cli-
mate change. Surface water, on the other hand, has been neglected. We have
ranked these concerns entirely backwards.
The World Bank, which has cited urban flood risk management as a
major future concern, specifically cautions against thinking in terms of sea
level rise. The World Bank instead warns that more coastal cities risk flood-
ing from poor management of surface water than from rising sea levels.5
Meanwhile, legal scholars have failed to engage the jurisprudence of
surface water liability, which governs when a landowner is responsible for
increasing the flow of water to a neighboring parcel of land.6 Generally,
landowners increase the flow on a neighboring parcel either inadvertently,
1. Evan Lehmann & ClimateWire, Extreme Rain May Flood 54 Million People by 2030,




4. The World Bank, Development Dialogue: Urban Flood Risk Management, STRIKING
POVERTY, http://strikingpoverty.worldbank.org/conversations/development-dialogue-urban-
flood-risk-management (last visited Aug. 28, 2015).
5. Id.
6. Only a few articles directly focus on liability for surface water and each dates to
several decades ago. See generally Donald V. Dobbins, Surface Water Drainage, 36 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 518 (1960–1961); Charles E. Bridges, The Application of Surface Water Rules in Urban
Areas, 42 MO. L. REV. 76 (1977).
Most commentary mentions surface water liability in passing while addressing other
related issues such as ground water pollution or ground water rights. See, e.g., Wendy B.
Davis, Reasonable Use Has Become the Common Enemy: An Overview of the Standards Applied to
Diffused Surface Waters and the Resulting Depletion of Aquifers, 9 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 1
(2004) (arguing for changes in surface water rules to support robust aquifers, while only
briefly mentioning the liability-related surface water rules).
More recently, a few student notes and comments have appeared that similarly gloss
over surface water liability. See, e.g., Darin L. Whitmer, Note, Common Enemy or Unilateral
Threat: Why Jurisdictions Need to Become Reasonable in Regards to Diffuse Surface Waters, 41
CREIGHTON L. REV. 423 (2008).
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through construction, or intentionally in an effort to protect their own land
from flooding. Multiplying the scale of future urban flooding by damages
and business losses means that surface water liability shows all the signs of
being an enormous source of litigation in the coming decades.
Surface water jurisprudence is badly situated for this influx of cases. In
the vast majority of jurisdictions, the law of surface waters remains cumber-
some and antiquated. Perhaps worse, it is simply confusing to attorneys,
clients, and courts.
Surface water cases form an endless mire of both torts and property
law.7 Surface water liability relies on causes of action from nuisance to in-
tentional tort to negligence to trespass.8 Defenses also come from both
fields of law and include acts of god9 and easements. As the Indiana Su-
preme Court has observed, while the basic rules of surface water “are
grounded upon real property concepts[,] [t]he modifications engrafted upon
them resulted from the use of tort law concepts[.]”10 Inevitably, courts
struggle with this fuzziness.
This Article critiques the surface water liability rules incorporated
across most jurisdictions in the United States through original research into
the agricultural science that supported these legal doctrines. By demonstrat-
ing how the legal doctrines emerged from agricultural science that we now
know is not only highly flawed, but also detrimental to the common well-
being, this Article demonstrates the need to break with past doctrines and
engage in a genuine rethinking of how to manage surface water liability in
the twenty-first century.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces original research
into the agricultural science that supported the surface water liability rules
Those writers who have discussed surface water liability, student or not, tend to focus
on a single jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nathan W.B. Smith, Drainage Easements: Caught in the Mire
of Alabama Common Law, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 659 (2002–2003) (discussing surface water in
the context of drainage easements within Alabama); Gregory C. Sisk, Comment, Toward a
Unified Reasonable Use Approach to Water Drainage in Washington, 59 WASH. L. REV. 61
(1983–1984) (discussing surface water rules in the state of Washington); Seth P. Hayes,
Note, In re Flood Litigation: When it Rains, the Lawsuits Pour, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 171
(2005–2006) (considering surface water rules, among other approaches to flood litigation,
within West Virginia).
7. As the California Supreme Court explained, “much of the confusion in [surface
water] law regarding rules and theories is caused by a failure to ascertain whether water
doctrine arises under property or tort law.” Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 536 (Cal. 1966).
8. See Kueffer v. Brown, 879 S.W.2d 658, 661–65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
9. See generally Jill M. Fraley, Humans Can Predict and Affect What Once Were “Acts of
God”, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/18/nat-
ural-disasters-or-acts-of-god/humans-can-predict-and-affect-what-once-were-acts-of-god
(discussing the “Acts of God” defense).
10. Argyelan v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973, 975–76 (Ind. 1982).
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adopted across the United States. This part contextualizes the evolution of
land improvement and drainage philosophy in the United States by ground-
ing it in the agricultural science of the time.
Part II presents the basics of the surface water liability doctrine, ex-
plaining how surface waters are defined, how multiple causes of action are
used to pursue surface water damages, and how the major rules for surface
water have evolved. This part will pay particular attention to how doctrines
evolved to support land management strategies of drainage and
improvement.
Finally, Part III will assess the current state of surface water rules and
examine how judicial applications of these doctrines continue to incorporate
the original foundations in eighteenth century agricultural science. The Ar-
ticle further investigates the impact of these doctrines on land development,
concluding that modern surface water liability expresses multiple prefer-
ences for development over non-development of land. This continued pref-
erence for development contributes to climate change by supporting the
destruction of natural carbon sequestration devices, and it increases the vul-
nerability of populations to the effects of climate change by reducing natu-
ral landscapes that provide buffers against storms and mitigate effects of
both sea level rise and flooding. The Article concludes by calling for a reex-
amination of surface water liability within legislatures and suggesting a new
approach that would be more consistent with modern theories of tort and
property liability, as well as more sustainable.
I. THE AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE BEHIND
SURFACE WATER JURISPRUDENCE
[T]here is no other Remedy but making a Water-Furrow in the adjacent
Field to carry it off . . . [Y]our neighbor will hardly refuse to let you . . .
unless he be over scrupulous about those two Words mine and thine, which
have been the bone of Contention betwixt all Mankind ever since the
Golden Age . . . .11
North American surface water rules evolved in the context of a specific
land and development philosophy, one supported by the agricultural science
of the eighteenth century. Our surface water rules have deep roots in the
British12 experience with their own low-lying countryside and in the British
11. ALEXANDER BLACKWELL, A NEW METHOD OF IMPROVING COLD, WET, AND BARREN LANDS
10 (n.p., 1741).
12. This Article discusses ideologies of land management that were present in England
and Wales prior to the Acts of Union with Scotland in 1707, as well as those present in
England, Scotland and Wales (and the colonies) after 1707. Given that the primary focus of
this Article is the policies as they were incorporated within the North American colonies
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colonization process in North America. The following sections provide
some context by illuminating social and political pressures for drainage, po-
litical support for such projects, and, most importantly, the agricultural sci-
ence that supported the British attitude toward drainage.
I have chosen to constrain and manage the task of engaging with the
historical mindset13 by elaborating a narrow history of land drainage philos-
ophy that converges neatly with the case study of surface water liability.
Additionally, I have incorporated small portions of primary sources
throughout that allow the reader to directly experience the flavor of con-
temporaneous writings.
A. British Attitudes Toward Land Management
British attitudes toward wetlands might be described as a bit of super-
stition, a bit of science, and a smattering of politics. In the following subsec-
tions I explain how attitudes towards wetlands emerged from a long history
of both rational and irrational fears about swamps—from legends of ghosts
and witches to the dangers of navigating a bog on foot. Additionally, wet-
lands provided little to no economic return, adding frustration to fear. Cul-
turally, one might say that the British were predestined to loathe wetlands.
Building on this foundation, I explain how the agricultural science of the era
neatly proposed an answer to this loathing: drain the wetlands, creating new
flat land for planting. As technologies for drainage expanded and labor costs
decreased with population pressure, drainage became more widely available.
As availability increased, so did pressure on landowners from multiple
sources: economic, political, and religious. In the third subsection I explain
how these forces worked together to push drainage on landowners. Finally,
in the last subsection I discuss the responses of the landowning British to
these pressures.
after 1707, for ease of reference I have adopted the term “British” rather than alternating
between “English,” “Welsh,” and “British.”
13. Admittedly, grasping the historical context can be a challenge for the modern
mind. Professor Sax has eloquently explained the contrast between the modern environmen-
tal mindset and the one that predominated as late as 1962 by his dating. See Joseph L. Sax,
Ownership, Property, and Sustainability, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2011). Such frustra-
tions, however, cannot daunt us, particularly if we accept, as Professors Nash and Stern have
persuasively argued, that psychological framing sharply impacts how we think about property
and make decisions about property rules. Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Prop-
erty Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449, 452–54 (2010).
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1. Fear and Loathing, or How British Landowners
Felt About Wetlands
[H]eath, a place of tombs, Waste, desolate, where Ruin dreary dwells.14
The landowning British15 long despised their marshes, fens, and
swamps. Such lands were “utterly a waste.”16 The very existence of such
drowned acres created “a nuisance” for their owners.17
But the sentiment went beyond economic frustration to outright fear.
Daniel Defoe described such marshy areas as “dangerous Places to Man and
Beast that many have been swallowed up in them.”18 Land that could not be
drained resembled the diseased body—it was “incurable.”19 Artful descrip-
tions tell us that such land was “miry ground, where the water stands, and
there is no way to cleanse it[.]”20 Fears of wetlands and what resided within
them became an enduring feature of British literature that would be cap-
tured even centuries later in such classics as The Hound of the Baskervilles.21
Motivated by both their fears of the swamps and their frustrations with
lands that were economically nonproductive, British farmers saw the situa-
tion in rather simple terms: the best thing to do with a swamp was to get
rid of it if possible.
2. A Swamp Would Be a Marvelous Field: The
Agricultural Science that Affirmed Drainage
From a modern perspective, it may be difficult to imagine why British
landowners (and later colonists) would so fervently embrace drainage for
agricultural purposes. Given the modern understanding of how crucial top-
soil is to any agricultural enterprise,22 farmers today would understand how
14. David Mallet, The Excursion, A Poem in Two Cantons, in 1 THE WORKS OF DAVID
MALLET 65, 78 (n.p., A. Millar & P. Vailant 1759).
15. I specify “the landowning British” because there was a poor, non-landowning popu-
lation that derived some amount (if not all) of their meager living from the undeveloped
areas, including the wetlands. Others have written of the opposition encountered from this
population during drainage projects. See, e.g., C.S. ORWIN, THE OPEN FIELDS 19 (2d ed.
1954). For a discussion of the multiple attitudes to improvement and the poor among the
British, see generally Laura Brace, Husbanding the Earth and Hedging out the Poor, in LAND AND
FREEDOM: LAW, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE BRITISH DIASPORA (A.R. Buck, John McLaren &
Nancy E. Wright, eds. 2001) (arguing that improvement is a contested concept).
16. 1 JOHN MORDANT, THE COMPLETE STEWARD 74 (n.p., W. Sandby 1761).
17. Id. at 70–71.
18. WILLIAM ELLIS, AGRICULTURE IMPROVED 42 (London, 1745).
19. 2 JOHN FLAVEL, THE WHOLE WORKS OF THE REVERED MR. JOHN FLAVEL 173 (n.p., 1754).
20. Id.
21. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE HOUND OF THE BASKERVILLES (P.F. Collier 1902).
22. For a discussion of how topsoil is critical to food security, how certain soils do not
support edible plants, etc., see Nicholas A. Fromherz, The Case for a Global Treaty on Soil
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economically challenging it would be to make former swampland profitable
for long enough to offset the costs of drainage. Understanding the British
mindset requires knowledge of the evolution of agricultural science.
As of the mid-1600s, British farmers did not know what water, air, soil,
or sunlight contributed to make plants grow.23 They wondered “whether all
things are nourished by Vapors, Fumes, Atoms, Effluvia?”24 Just over a hun-
dred years later, in 1757, the musings hardly differed. Writers wondered
whether nutrients for plants came from “juices” in the earth or, instead, if
they were “furnished by the air, and put into action by the sun.”25 Farmers
practiced historic techniques but held little knowledge on the specifics of
how and why some plantings succeeded while others failed.
One experiment cited for years in the literature of agriculture and hus-
bandry encouraged British readers to conclude that soil was less important
in the success of plantings than other factors. The experiment involved
placing a seedling weighing five pounds into a segregated portion of 200
pounds of earth.26 The tree received water and sunlight; no soil or fertiliz-
ers were added or removed. After five years, the tree weighed 169 pounds,
three ounces; the soil diminished only two ounces.27 The experimenter con-
cluded that “the vegetable nourishment is principally in the air.”28 Soils, for
their part, would “imbibe certain qualities from the air.”29 Daniel Carless
Webb argued that “enclosing land will in a degree assist vegetation, by
preventing the winds from carrying away those fertile juices, which are the
chief support of plants;” otherwise “[w]hatever rises from the earth by exha-
lation [ ] proceeds . . . [unless] some object detains it.”30 Another camp saw
the primary benefits in water, concluding that “[t]he ancients generally enti-
tled the Earth to the production of the animals, vegetables, and other bod-
ies, upon and about it[.]”31 Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth
Conservation, Sustainable Farming, and the Preservation of Agrarian Culture, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q.
57, 63–68 (2012).
23. SAMUEL HARTLIB, A DISCOURSE OF HUSBANDRY USED IN BRABANT AND FLANDERS 38 (2d
ed., n.p., 1652) (explaining that farmers “know not what Chalk, Ashes, Dung, Marle, Water,
Air, Earth, Sun, etc. do contribute: whether something Essential, or Accidental; Material or
Immaterial; Corporal or Spiritual”).
24. Id.
25. R. BRADLEY, A GENERAL TREATISE OF AGRICULTURE, BOTH PHILOSOPHICAL AND PRACTICAL 13
(n.p., 1757).
26. Id. at 13–14.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 15.
29. Id. at 18.
30. DANIEL CARLESS WEBB, AN ADDRESS TO THE PUBLIC, SETTING FORTH THE BENEFIT ACCRUING
TO THE COMMUNITY AT LARGE BY ENCLOSING THE LANDS NOW LAYING WASTE IN GREAT BRITAIN 6
(n.p., 1795).
31. 1 JOHN MILLS, A NEW AND COMPLETE SYSTEM OF PRACTICAL HUSBANDRY 4 (n.p., 1757).
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centuries, “the moderns, and among them some of very great
name . . . declared in favor of Water, as the efficient cause of vegetation.”32
Persuasive writers concluded that “for the nourishment of vegetables, water
is almost all in all.”33 John Mills, for one, wrote, “Mr. Tull is the only per-
son who makes earth the food of plants. The experience of all ages contra-
dicts this opinion . . . .”34 Writers wrestled over the benefits of air and
water, but few saw importance in soil itself as more than a supporting struc-
ture for the roots.
The introduction of fertilizers into the soil—a common practice at the
time—did not depend on a belief that the soil fed plants. As one writer
observed: “[I]f the earth alone was the food of the plants, it would in all
cases produce the same effect.”35 Instead, planters often viewed fertilizers as
changing the temperature of the soil rather than injecting any necessary
nutrient. Thus, Mills could say, “[I]t is a great folly to dung grounds which
require cooling, as it would be to administer poison, to cure a man of a
fever.”36 Similarly, the burning of land did not support husbandry by intro-
ducing ash or minerals to the soil, but rather by the “heat of the fire warm-
ing the Land [which] wastes the Acid, sterile juices, that hinder the fertility
of it[.]”37
What then was the purpose of soil? Lord Bacon concluded “the earth
doth but keep the plant upright, and save it from over-heat and over-
cold.”38 Soils were only problematic when they did not “afford sufficient
stability to the plants” or were unable to “retain moisture enough to convey
them their necessary food.”39 Thus, for example “[m]eer sand is too easily
divested of its moisture and nutritive parts, which, on the other hand, are
too closely locked up in clay.”40 Managing for temperature, air, and water,
then, “[g]rounds . . . as simple Clays, Sands, or Gravels, together may be all
good, and all fit to bring forth increase; or all evil and barren, and unfit for
profit[.]”41 The content of the soil mattered as a background: maintaining
temperature, conducting air and water, and supporting stability.
32. Id.
33. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 35.
37. JOHN MORTIMER, THE WHOLE ART OF HUSBANDRY, OR THE WAY OF MANAGING AND IM -
PROVING OF LAND 65 (n.p., 1707).
38. 1 MILLS, supra note 31, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. at 34.
40. Id.
41. GERVASE MARKHAM, MARKHAM’S FAREWELL TO HUSBANDRY: OR, THE ENRICHING OF ALL
SORT OF BARREN AND STERILE GROUNDS IN OUR NATION 1 (n.p., 1676).
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Believing in the science of the day, British landowners were convinced
that “[t]he river swamp lands, by proper culture and judicious management,
are of inexhaustible fertility.”42 The best soils were those “most exposed to
the influences of the sun and air,” which suggested drainage as a method of
exposing more soil to those proper influences.43 When faced with marshy
land, “the remedy is easy, by making proper drains to carry off the superflu-
ous moisture.”44 Proponents of drainage argued that “in a short time” with
“large and deep Ditch[es]” a bog could become “good Ground either for
orchard, Hops, or Pasture.”45 The “chief benefit by this Improvement [would
be that] . . . all those Lands that lye wet by reason of Inundation of Water
or Land Springs, etc., would be layed dry by Drayning.”46 Such lands would
then be added to the arable acreage.
Adopting drainage made so much sense to writers of the era that they
felt pressured to explain why the marshlands had not been drained previ-
ously. Most writers answered by citing the lack of scientific knowledge in
earlier eras. As John Smith described in 1798, “Our forefathers, ignorant of
the art or advantage of draining, pitched not upon the best, but upon the
driest fields. If the plain was too wet to admit the plough they passed by
it . . . .”47 Similarly, Alexander Hewatt, writing in 1779, explained that
swamps had been “carefully avoided” because “[h]itherto the planters re-
mained utter strangers to the value and fertility of the lowlands[.]”48
3. For Country and King: Drainage as Politics,
Economics, and Religion
Freedom, whose influence is more benign than sunshine and zephyrs, who
covers the rugged rock with soil, drains the sickly swamp, and clothes the
brown heath in verdure; who dresses the labourer’s face with smiles, and
makes him behold his increasing family with delight and exaltation.49
42. 1 ALEXANDER HEWATT, AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE COLO-
NIES OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND GEORGIA 81 (n.p., 1779).
43. 1 MILLS, supra note 31, at 17.
44. Id. at 176.
45. WILLIAM LEYBOURN, THE COMPLEAT SURVEYOR, OR, THE WHOLE ART OF SURVEYING OF
LAND 132 (5th ed., London, 1722).
46. JOHN SMITH, ENGLAND’S IMPROVEMENT REVIV’D: IN A TREATISE OF ALL MANNER OF HUS-
BANDRY AND TRADE BY LAND AND SEA 11 (London, Tho. Newcomb 1673).
47. JOHN SMITH, GENERAL VIEW OF THE AGRICULTURE OF THE COUNTY OF ARGYLL 171 (Edin-
burgh, Mundell & Son 1798).
48. 1 HEWATT, supra note 42, at 110.
49. 1 JOHN MOORE, A VIEW OF SOCIETY AND MANNERS IN FRANCE, SWITZERLAND, GERMANY
AND ITALY 341 (Philadelphia, Robert Bell, 1783).
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[H]ow picturesque the description of the waste from whence arose
an Eden.50
The improvement of lands “tend[ed] to no less an object than the aug-
mentation of real national wealth.”51 Draining lands essentially allowed a
process of internal colonization, “a new acquisition of territories” within the
country by creating new arable acres from previously waterlogged land.52
When farmers drained lands that had been under water, they supported the
Crown and the national interest by increasing the tax base via increasing the
number of arable acres. Additionally, British landowners strongly believed
that “an industrious tilling and improving of Lands, [was] a principal means
to beget and support a Trade[.]”53 Additional arable acres meant additional
crops such as flax and wheat that could augment what we would now call
the gross domestic product. When landowners embarked on new cultiva-
tions upon the wastelands, those lands could become a “great advantage to
the proprietors, besides being an ornament and real use to the country.”54
If draining vast sections of land could create more arable acres, then it
was possible to claim that rather than having a population problem, “En-
gland [was] thinly inhabited.”55 Writers speculated that if the “moors,
des[e]rts, and commons” were cultivated, then “there could be little doubt of
its maintaining two millions of more people than at present[.]”56 Increasing
the number of arable acres within the country would solve problems of
poverty and increasing population, which could at any time become a threat
to the ruling powers. Thus, Arthur Young mused, “I know not so melan-
choly a reflection, as the idea of such waste and uncultivated lands being so
common in a kingdom that loudly complains of the want of bread.”57 A
simple solution presented itself, not only for the landowner, but for the
kingdom; new arable lands meant that “bread and beef will be plentiful.”58
By 1652, Silvanus Taylor had argued that the undeveloped, marshy waste-
50. Percy Lodge, A Poem by the Rev. Mr. Moses Brown, in 1 THE CRITICAL REVIEW, OR,
ANNALS OF LITERATURE 167 (Smollett et al. eds., London, 1756).
51. LOUIS-FRANÇOIS-HENRI TURBILLY, MEMOIRE SUR LES DÉFRICHEMENS 310 (Paris, Chez la
Veuve D’Houry 1760).
52. BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 3–4.
53. JOHN WORLDIGE, MR. WORLDIGE’S TWO TREATISES viii (London, 1694).
54. 2 DAVID LOCH, ESSAYS ON THE TRADE, COMMERCE, AND MANUFACTURES, AND FISHERIES
OF SCOTLAND 193 (Edinburgh, Walter & Thomas Ruddiman 1778).
55. Philosophical Transactions Continued, in 2 THE CRITICAL REVIEW, OR, ANNALS OF LITERA-
TURE 127 (Smollett et al. eds., London, 1756).
56. ARCHIBALD GRANT, A DISSERTATION ON THE CHIEF OBSTACLES TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF
LAND THROUGHOUT SCOTLAND 26 (n.p., 1760).
57. ARTHUR YOUNG, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WASTE LANDS OF GREAT
BRITAIN 38 (London, 1773).
58. Id.
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lands were in fact a chief cause of “wandering poor” in England.59 There-
fore, developing new arable lands would limit political unrest and “prove of
advantage to the poor in general, by employing them in profitable and
healthful exercises.”60 Indeed, draining to combat poverty ignited the agri-
cultural fantasies of those who wrote about it: “[W]hat an immense number
of souls might be kept upon the extra produce which this land is capable of
producing, by Draining alone!”61 There was no reason to leave a salt marsh
as it was. While “so many are calling out for bread to eat . . . it surely
behooves any man who loves his country” to pursue improvement.62 Drain-
age and improvement fulfilled political, economic, and social obligations of
landowners. Writers of pamphlets and books encouraged drainage, citing as
their own motivations “Publique-heartednesse and great Zeal for the Com-
mon good.”63 Draining in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries went
beyond a popular approach to land management to become a moral obliga-
tion of sorts for the betterment of England, the feeding of the poor, and the
economic success of the nation.
These socio-political strains of thought intertwined with a religious ap-
proach to labor and work ethic. As Laura Brace has written, “[f]or the im-
provers, the notion of improvement was fundamental to God’s intentions
for the earth and for mankind.”64 Man failed in his duty where “the broad
lines of nature remain[ed] unobliterated.”65 Cultivation, along with its many
indicators of hard work meant that the British had found favor with God.66
Accordingly, drainage and the creation of new arable acres provided even
greater evidence of labor and divine favor.
The British colonization efforts reflect these religious and economic
themes of drainage and document the export of the British attitudes to new
lands. British colonists believed that old countries, long settled by Europe-
ans, had “fewer stagnations of water, no swamps,” and therefore, “[were]
59. SILVANUS TAYLOR, COMMON GOOD: OR THE IMPROVEMENT OF COMMONS, FORESTS, AND
CHASES BY INCLOSURE 28 (n.p., 1652).
60. BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 4. Notably, some even argued that undrained, unim-
proved lands were responsible for “producing multitudes of poor, ignorant, lazy and improvi-
dent people.” WORLIDGE, supra note 53, at 16.
61. HENRY HUTCHINSON, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICAL DRAINAGE OF LAND 8 (London,
Houlston and Stoneman 1844).
62. YOUNG, supra note 57, at 54.
63. SAMUEL HARTLIB, A DISCOVERIE FOR DIVISION OR SETTING OUT OF LAND, AS TO THE BEST
FORM 2 (London, 1653). The British found improvement of wastelands to be a matter “of
public concern,” one that should “claim the attention of every reader.” 2 WILLIAM KENRICK,
LONDON REVIEW OF ENGLISH AND FOREIGN LITERATURE 27 (n.p., 1776).
64. Brace, supra note 15, at 6.
65. 2 WILLIAM MARSHALL, THE RURAL ECONOMY OF THE WEST OF ENGLAND 2 (n.p., 1796).
66. 2 FLAVEL, supra note 19, at 163.
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fertile to [that] day to a degree of luxuriance scarce known to new coun-
tries.”67 Colonists endeavored to establish a “spirit of planting,” which
would then “spread[ ] wider and wider daily.”68 Thus, supporters of the
colonial projects concluded that “the greatest encouragement possible ought
to be given by all the emmets of power and estate in every part of the
colon[ies], to the enclosure and improvement of all the open grounds and
waste land of the whole country.”69 It was of no matter if, at the outset, a
colony was a “waste of savage country,” because all of the focus fell on the
natural resources and the ability of British colonists to transform the
landscape.70
4. How Landowners and the State Responded to the
Science and Cultural Forces
Whereas in diverse counties great quantities of waste and barren lands,
and lands which were formerly fen or marsh ground, or covered with
water, have been of late years improved or drained.71
With science, religion, politics, and folk culture all pushing landowners
to eliminate wetlands, British agrarians unsurprisingly adopted drainage
with fervor as soon as drainage became reasonably technologically and fi-
nancially feasible. Drainage provided a logical way to expand estates and
enhance profits. The only questions were how to do it and how much it
would cost. While some drainage happened early, much of it waited for new
technologies and lower labor costs.72 As time went on, however, the expense
of drainage remained significant. As a result, when population pressures
rose in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the government explored
ways of incentivizing drainage without state expenditures. Rather than
making direct investments themselves, monarchs encouraged drainage by
67. 28 SYLVANUS URBAN, THE GENTLEMAN’S MAGAZINE AND CHRONICLE 585 (n.p., 1758).
68. 1 W. STRAHAN & T. CADELL, PRESENT STATE OF HUSBANDRY IN SCOTLAND 184 (n.p.,
1778).
69. DERMOT O’PHEILLY, THE ANTS: A RHAPSODY 41 (n.p., 1767).
70. ROBERT DODSLEY, THE ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A VIEW OF THE HISTORY, POLITICKS, AND
LITERATURE FOR THE YEAR 1763, at 18–19 (n.p., 1764).
71. 18 THE STATUTES AT LARGE FROM THE 15TH YEAR TO THE 20TH YEAR OF KING GEORGE II 267
(Danby Pickering ed., n.p., 1765).
72. As soon as the technology was available in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
(setting aside for the moment earlier Roman attempts and failures), the British drained vast
lowland areas by employing ditches, canals, and storm barriers. JOHN ABERTH, AN ENVIRON-
MENTAL HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE AGES: THE CRUCIBLE OF NATURE 33 (2013).
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making land grants contingent upon undertaking the work.73 Additional in-
centives included tithe relief for seven years following the conversion of
wetlands to arable land.74
Despite the costs, as populations continued to rise, drainage became
even more common. One indicator of this trend is the explosion of litera-
ture on the topic. By the mid-eighteenth century, instructions for improve-
ment and drainage became its own genre within British publishing. Books
explained how to drain lands depending on their type and proximity to the
sea or other waterways.75 Literature of this period speaks with a religious
zeal of the potential of improvement and drainage projects, which could
take lands that were filled with standing brackish water, and “[through] in-
dustry . . . produce[ ] comfort and opulence, by forming excellent pasture
land out of the swamps and bogs, and even making them capable of produc-
ing large crops of corn.”76 A sophisticated landowner of the time would
surely have employed such techniques.77
73. Viola Florence Barnes, Land Tenure in English Colonial Charters of the Seventeenth
Century, in ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY PRESENTED TO CHARLES MCLEAN ANDREWS BY HIS STU-
DENTS 10–11 (1931).
74. JOSEPH HIGGS, A GUIDE TO JUSTICES 306 (n.p., 1742).
75. See, e.g., 1 MORDANT, supra note 16, at 70–74.
76. RICHARD BROOKES, BROOKES’ GENERAL GAZETTER ABRIDGED (unpaginated) (n.p., 1796).
77. Whether or not such drainage projects were actually profitable, or simply fervently
imagined to be so, remains a question. Surely the answer differs depending on the type of
wetland drained, the type of soil found beneath, and other measures taken such as the intro-
duction of fertilizers.
Some sources suggest successful endeavors in draining and improvement, although
often without detailing the types of landscapes or the acreage. For example, a statute in the
year 1765 proclaimed that lands that “have been of late years improved or drained . . . are
now of very considerable annual value.” 18 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 71, at 267. More
often, the historian finds sources that speculate as to the potential profits that may be gar-
nered, but not evidence of actual accomplishments. For examples of such writings, see HAR-
TLIB, supra note 63, at 4 (speculating that lands would increase 1400 times their value within
seven years) and YOUNG, supra note 57, at 47–48 (providing a four year plan of investments,
with growth each year and concluding that “[i]n this method . . . [the land] would make a
considerable figure”).
Other evidence, however, suggests that successful drainages were not possible. First,
without steam power, the draining of wetlands created a massive operation of manual labor
and complicated engineering. See ORWIN, supra note 15, at 15–19. The tools of drainage were
“plow, spades, scoops, shovels, and forks.” LEYBOURN, supra note 45, at 130. Not all contempo-
raries were convinced about the successful prospects of drainage. John Flavel favored im-
provement of lands generally, but when it came to those “miry ground[s], where the water
stands,” he found that there was “no way to cleanse it, that it can never be made fruitful [and,
therefore] [t]he husbandman is fain to let it alone, as an incurable piece of waste and worth-
less ground.” 2 FLAVEL, supra note 19, at 173.
Scholars, for their part, have been more convinced that improvement of the waste lands
rarely produced substantial results. Many such lands “only ever turned in relatively low
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B. Colonization and Exporting Land Improvement Philosophies
1. Land Improvement and Land Claiming
During Colonization
Ideas about land improvement served as cornerstones of the British col-
onization process. Moving hand-in-hand with planting as a primary British
colonial strategy and justification for external territorial control, improve-
ment policies and land attitudes traveled widely under British rule. When
European powers disagreed about territorial claims,78 the British appealed
to possession79 and, more specifically, to improvement of the land as justifi-
cation for their claims.80 British landowners imposed their system of land
control, ownership, and valuation along with their related concept of im-
provement. British ideas of proper agricultural techniques, which were more
entrenched after the evangelical literature of improvement, involved a cate-
gorization of certain lands as unproductive, even when those lands may have
been agriculturally productive before colonization.81 The very British idea
of straight rows and fenced gardens was crucial to the colonization process.
These agricultural techniques created visible changes to the landscape, cre-
ating tangible evidence of occupation and investments of labor that could be
used to justify territorial claims vis-à-vis other European powers.82 Addi-
tionally, the narrative of landscape changes allowed British colonists to ar-
gue the superiority of a labor investment in land over simple occupation, a
yields,” and as a result scholars have concluded “the assumption that, in general, enclosure of
‘waste land’ transformed large areas of unproductive land to fertile farmland is at best ques-
tionable.” TOM WILLIAMSON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF RURAL ENGLAND: FARMING AND THE LAND-
SCAPE 1700–1870, at 19 (2002).
78. By distinguishing British claims vis-à-vis other European powers from claims
against native tribes, I do not intend to suggest that agricultural practices were not a part of
the British argument against native possession. Indeed, agricultural practices formed a cen-
tral part of those arguments as well. For an in-depth explanation of how agricultural argu-
ments contributed to dispossession of native lands, see WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN’S
LAND/WHITE MAN’S LAW (1995).
79. For an excellent account of the British reliance on possession—and particularly cul-
tivation and fencing—as justification against competing European territorial claims, see PA-
TRICIA SEED, CEREMONIES OF POSSESSION IN EUROPE’S CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD 1492–1640
(1995).
80. Christopher Tomlins, In a Wilderness of Tigers: Violence, the Discourse of English Colo-
nizing, and the Refusals of American History, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 451, 481 (2003).
81. Andrew Sluyter, Colonialism and Landscape in the Americas: Material/Conceptual
Transformations and Continuing Consequences, 91 ANNALS ASS’N AM . GEOGRAPHERS 410, 411
(2001).
82. BARBARA ARNEIL, JOHN LOCKE AND AMERICA: THE DEFENSE OF ENGLISH COLONIALISM 18
(1996).
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strategy that fit their needs both in arguments against native peoples83 and
lightly inhabited French lines of forts.84
British colonists knew how much labor and inhabitance produced visi-
ble and permanent evidence on the landscape. The degree of change from
nature aligned with a precise hierarchy of civilization: “The garden is the
highest state of cultivation; open fields and common pastures the low-
est . . . .”85 As the Gentleman’s Magazine and Historical Chronicle explained in
1758, “Nothing is more certain than that men level forests, drain off waste
waters, deepen the shallow currents of great rivers and in process of time
give the earth a quite different face to that of countries uninhabited or but
lately peopled.”86 The colonists believed that the “soil is always rich” when a
swamp in North America was “cleared and drained,” becoming “proper for
the growth of rice, hemp, and indigo.”87 Such descriptions suggest that
landscape changes provided the kind of evidence needed to prove long-
standing habitation when foreign powers challenged British claims to land.
The British contrasted their own approach to colonization with that of
the French. Rather than planning “to plant and settle,” the French instead
“erected military forts.”88 In the British view, “[w]hen any members of a
civilized people leave their native land to settle in a waste, uncultivated
country, the natural employment of these emigrants must be agriculture,
and a confined sort of a commerce.”89
83. The argument followed along these lines against native peoples:
For they account it a very just Cause of War, if any Nation will hinder others to
come and possess a Part of their Soil, of which they make no use, but let it lie idle
and uncultivated; since every Man has by the Law of Nature a right to such a
waste Portion of the Earth, as is necessary for his Subsistence.
THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA: OR THE HAPPY REPUBLIC 61 (Gilbert Burnet trans., Glasgow, Robert
Foulis 1743).
84. For further explanation of why the occupation/labor distinction was important, and
for Locke’s role in formulating these arguments for British colonists, see ARNEIL, supra note
82, at 18.
85. 1 WILLIAM MARSHALL, THE RURAL ECONOMY OF YORKSHIRE 50 (London, T. Cadell 1788).
86. 28 URBAN, supra note 67, at 585.
87. 2 JOHN HUDDLESTONE WYNNE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN AMERICA
323 (London, Royal-Exchange 1770).
88. Id. at 11. In the British view only “barbarous nations . . . abolished improved Agri-
culture[,]” instead “possessing, without labor or trouble, the vast desarts which their arms had
made, and cultivated, very superficially, only a small spot near their habitations.” 1 MILLS,
supra note 31, at v.
89. 2 WYNNE, supra note 87, at 11.
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2. British Colonists and Land Improvement in
Early North America
Drainage was, however, more than a political tactic in the race to colo-
nize; it was a part of British culture that became imprinted on the new land.
British colonists imported to North America the deep history of drainage in
Britain, including all of the cultural, political, religious, and folk reasons for
embracing drainage. Arthur Young would eventually write, “[M]any
emigrants that have gone to America, have, when they got there, cultivated
much worse lands than our moors.”90
By 1713, for example, patentees in Virginia could settle their lands
(thereby vesting their property rights) either by planting three of every fifty
acres granted, or alternatively, by clearing and draining three acres of wet-
lands.91 Thus, it could be said of Virginia that “[b]efore being planted it
consisted of forests, bogs and morasses, which the people in the West Indies
called swamps, and such the greatest part of it is at present.”92
On the island of Manhattan, the New York General Assembly found in
1733 that a “[s]wamp has lain undrained, and of no Use to the Governors of
this Colony for the Time being, and all along been a Nuisance to the Inhab-
itants of the City of New York, by the noisom Vapours that arise thereout
for want of clearing and draining.”93
Moreover, such areas often produced unpleasant externalities when lo-
cated in proximity to more developed areas. It requires little imagination to
conjure what might have resided in the swampy waters of lower urban areas
in an age that preceded indoor plumbing and granted pigs free passage
about town.
Writing in 1761, local government officials informed the Lords Com-
missoners for Trade and Plantation that North Carolina included “several
large Swamps or Bogs . . . not being drained which will be the best Lands in
the Province when reclaimed.”94 Similarly, the area north of the Ohio River
was praised by colonists for having “no swamps but such as may be readily
drained, and made into arable and meadowland.”95
90. YOUNG, supra note 57, at 43.
91. EDWARD T. PRICE, DIVIDING THE LAND: EARLY AMERICAN BEGINNINGS OF OUR PRIVATE
PROPERTY MOSAIC 115 (1995).
92. 44 THE MODERN PART OF AN UNIVERSAL HISTORY 46 (London, 1759).
93. LAWS OF NEW YORK FROM THE YEAR 1691, TO 1751, INCLUSIVE 215 (James Parker ed.,
1752).
94. The Colony, Its Climate, Soil, Population, Government, Resources, &c., in 6 THE COLO-
NIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 608 (William Laurence Saunders ed., n.p., 1888).
95. 2 WILLIAM WINTERBOTHAM, AN HISTORICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL, COMMERCIAL AND PHILO-
SOPHICAL VIEW OF THE AMERICAN UNITED STATES AND OF THE EUROPEAN SETTLEMENTS IN AMERICA
AND THE WEST-INDIES 482 (n.p., 1799).
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Some may question why colonists would embark on such drainage
projects, citing as counter-evidence the low population and large territorial
expanse of North America. There are three potential answers. First, the
British agricultural science of the time held that very good soil rested below
those swampy waters.96 Combined with the idea of drainage as a moral
imperative, such “scientific” beliefs would explain the embrace of drainage
on the new continent.
Second, relations with native peoples impacted the choice to drain in
multiple ways. At the initial point of settlement, North America hardly
abounded in empty land—archeological records suggest very substantial na-
tive populations. The idea of an empty and untouched North America
sounds more in colonial politics than in historical accuracy. Scholars have
long cited the “myth of emptiness” as part of the rhetoric of British coloni-
zation, which portrayed the Americas as “lack[ing] dense populations and
productive land uses.”97
Third, for reasons of both security and transportation,98 early settle-
ments were concentrated along the coasts and tidal river areas.99 Coloniza-
tion struggled, probably in part because “[a] man not forced to leave his
country, would not chose to . . . settle upon the low, flat, marshy sandy
coast of the central colonies[.]”100 The problem was that the “farther back
the settlers went, the finer they found the country and climate, and the
more fertile the soil; but then, they always lived in the hazard of war.”101 As
a result, expansion to the wetlands that surrounded early settlements was
more logical and less risky than expanding to areas further afield.
Finally, the areas that would have most lent themselves to cultivation
would have been the fields long prepared by natives.102 Colonists’ initial
96. See 1 HEWATT, supra note 42, at 81.
97. Sluyter, supra note 81, at 412. For a discussion of colonial sources utilizing the
emptiness argument and analysis of their rhetorical strategies see Tomlins, supra note 80, at
488.
98. Given the need to carry tools, water, and food to one’s workplace for the day,
British lands were traditionally best cultivated near settlements. Thus, “some part of their
barest grounds . . . lieth so far from the town where unto it doth belong, that seldome, or
never it is manured.” ARTHUR STANDISH, NEW DIRECTIONS OF EXPERIENCE TO THE COMMONS COM -
PLAINT BY THE INCOURAGEMENT OF THE KINGS 7 (n.p., 1653).
99. 1 HERBERT L. OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 437
(1904).
100. YOUNG, supra note 57, at 25.
101. Id. at 12. Over time, of course, colonists would “gradually . . . stretch backward, and
occupy such fresh spots of ground as promised them the greatest returns.” 1 HEWATT, supra
note 42, at 194.
102. Having been claimed from the forests, such cleared and cultivated fields may re-
present “a capital endowment equivalent to a century of labor.” John Brooke, Ecology, in
COMPANION TO COLONIAL AMERICA 61 (Daniel Vickers ed., 2003).
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expansions into the upland tended to be specifically to these native fields.103
Such expansions, however, increased the likelihood of conflicts. Scholars
have persuasively argued that competition over these prepared lands “lay at
the heart of the genocidal warfare with surviving native peoples” through-
out the seventeenth century.104 This may have encouraged colonists to con-
sider draining nearby wetlands as an alternative.
C. American Adoption of the British Improvement Philosophy
Once established, the British approach to land valuation and planning
continued long beyond the colonial period. By 1791, the New York legisla-
ture found itself compelled to pass an Act requiring private landowners “to
fill in, and raise the tract of land” known as “The Meadows” because
“through the inattention of their owners” the lots had “become deep sunk
holes, the receptacles of water in the rainy seasons, and the source of many
unwholesome and noxious stenches.”105 The legislature decided the solution
was to raise the lots as much as necessary “to convey into the East River all
the water which shall from time to time fall on the said tract of land.”106
Draining lands and re-routing small streams continued throughout the
nineteenth century and beyond, although the activity dwindled with the
availability of more easily improved lands. The practices remained strong,
though, in 1844 when Henry Hutchinson wrote his treatise explaining the
many methods of draining lands and improving soils.107 Hutchinson was
cognizant from the first page that his treatise entered a rather robust genre,
explaining “the Author is aware that a great deal has already been written
upon the subject by men well qualified to judge the merits and value of
draining.”108
Arising from the philosophy of improvement, the right to drain lands
(and therefore to increase the volume of a watercourse) became standard
within American property and nuisance law. As Thompson on Real Property
explains, “As a general rule, the law allows landowners to discharge water
into natural waterbodies as a means of draining the land. This right is rec-
ognized in the common law as well as in the statutes of many
jurisdictions.”109
103. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 99, at 437.
104. Brooke, supra note 102.
105. 2 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 447 (Thomas Greenleaf ed., 1792).
106. Id.
107. HUTCHINSON, supra note 61.
108. Id. at 1.
109. 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 50.20(e) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994). There are
few limitations to the right: “Such discharge may occur without liability where 1) the drain-
age results from the reasonable use of the land, 2) the waters are not diverted into water-
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When improvement through drainage was successful, however, the nat-
ural consequence was the casting of surface waters onto other lands.110 To
foster a culture of land improvement, governments needed liability rules for
surface water that fostered development. These rules are the dominant
trend in American history concerning surface water. As the next part of this
Article will explain, while some jurisdictions adopted outright rules to favor
development, others instead modified their rules to adopt exceptions favor-
ing development.
II. LIABILITY FOR SURFACE WATER
Traditionally, courts adopted one of two positions with respect to sur-
face water liability. In their purest formulations, the two approaches—
known as the common enemy doctrine and the civil law rule—are nearly
opposites.111 This part discusses each rule in its basic form and then pro-
ceeds to the many exceptions and variations that were adopted in response
to modern circumstances. Before addressing these rules, however, it is criti-
cal to understand precisely what constitutes surface waters, as distinguished
from watercourses.
A. Defining Surface Waters and Watercourses
The definition of surface waters is critical because surface waters are
not far removed, in geographical terms, from watercourses, and courts have
developed distinctive approaches for each. Surface water cases address run-
off, from either ordinary or extraordinary precipitation, that moves from
one property to another. Such waters move across the surface of the land, as
opposed to within the water bodies. Water that moves within the water
bodies, even when those overflow their usual bounds, is not surface water.
Because surface waters are defined in opposition to watercourses, it is
helpful to consider the definition of a watercourse. One of the more elabo-
rate explanations states, “To constitute a water course, it must appear that
the water usually flows in a particular direction; and by a regular channel,
having a bed with banks and sides . . . . It may sometimes be dry. It need
not flow continuously; but it must have a well-defined and substantial exis-
courses which would not have received the water naturally, and 3) the natural capacity of the
watercourse is not exceeded.” Id.
110. Thus, when one party engaged in “cutting ditches on his own land, contiguous to
the water course, and making banks, and clearing and cultivating the land” in the occupation
and use of his land, he “increased the quantity of water which flowed or run down the water
course.” Williams v. Gale, 3 H. & J. 231, 231 (Md. 1811).
111. Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Governing Interference With
Drainage of Surface Waters, 93 A.L.R.3d 1193, 1197 (1979).
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tence.”112 Surface waters, then, “occur[ ] on the surface of the land in an
unconfined state, such as ‘water from rain, melting snow, springs or seep-
age, or detached from subsiding floods, that lies or flows on the surface of
the earth but does not form a part of a watercourse or lake.’ ”113 As Thomp-
son observes, “A notable characteristic of diffused waters is their inability to
maintain an identity or existence as a confined waterbody.”114 The defini-
tion of surface waters thus derives from defining a natural watercourse to
“[b]e something more than a mere surface drainage over the entire face of a
tract of land, occasioned by unusual freshets or other extraordinary
causes.”115 Both landscape and temporal features clarify the definition: sur-
face waters are more transient and therefore have not created a topograph-
ical home for themselves, in contrast with the characteristic bed and banks
of a watercourse.
B. The Common Enemy Doctrine
As one of the oldest and originally most favored approaches to surface
water liability, the common enemy doctrine dates to a line of Massachusetts
cases from 1851, 1859, and 1865.116 The common enemy rule is occasionally
referred to as the “common law rule,”117 and it “apparently was adopted on
the mistaken assumption that it represented the common law of En-
gland.”118 Some have speculated that the general idea of water as a common
enemy may stem from the British approach to seawater.119 What is clear is
that American courts incorporated the British philosophy of land manage-
ment by choosing liability rules that prioritized development.
112. Morrison v. Bucksport & Bangor R.R. Co., 67 Me. 353, 356 (1877).
113. 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 109, § 50.20(b).
114. Id.
115. Belveal v. H.B.C. Dev. Co., 279 S.W.2d 545, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
116. Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 63 Mass. (1 Cush.) 171 (1851); Flagg v. Worcester, 79
Mass. (1 Gray) 601 (1859); Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (1 Allen) 106 (1865).
117. See Boyd v. Greene County, 644 S.W.2d 615, 616–17 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983) (apply-
ing the common enemy rule under the “common law” designation).
118. 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 109, § 50.20(g) (citing Walker v. New
Mexico, 165 U.S. 593 (1897)). Notably, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY explains, “English law
seems to favor the civil law rule.” Id. (citing Ewart v. Cochrane (1861) 4 Macq. (HL) 117
(appeal taken from Scot.) (UK)). The Supreme Court of Nebraska nicely summarized the
history of the common enemy doctrine, concluding that
[w]hat is known as the common enemy doctrine originated in Massachusetts and is
no part of the common-law rule. It has been adopted in some other states, gener-
ally with exceptions and modifications. While it is sometimes referred to in our
cases as the common-law rule, it actually has no relation thereto.
Nichol v. Yocum, 113 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Neb. 1962).
119. Bridges, supra note 6, at 78 n.19.
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As we saw in the history of improvement, there is a long-standing Brit-
ish tradition of treating standing water as an enemy—as something that
should be drained. As one writer explained, “when a Fen man has once
gotten the water decently out of his own premises, he leaves his neighbor to
guard for himself against its consequences.”120 British colonists and admin-
istrators imported this understanding of water as a common enemy to
North America, where it flourished until it was embraced by Massachusetts
courts. When the improvement of lands such as swamps and salt marshes
was a key goal of society, the common enemy doctrine made a great deal of
sense because it supported development. The doctrine continues to be the
primary approach to surface water liability in some jurisdictions today.121
The rule was, according to the last of the three Massachusetts cases,
“the plaintiff and defendant, being conterminous proprietors, had each the
right to develop, improve and enjoy his own estate; and if, as an incident to
the exercise of this right, the estate of the other was injured, he would have
no legal remedy for such injury.”122 In its purest form, the rule meant that
“each landowner [could] deal with [surface water] in such manner as best
suits his own convenience. Such sanctioned dealings include[d] walling it
out, walling it in and diverting or accelerating its flow by any means
whatever.”123 The common enemy doctrine holds that there is “no liability
as arising, per se, merely from the obstruction, or diversion, of the natural
drainage of surface water.”124 As the Maine Supreme Court put it, “any
proprietor of land may control the flow of mere surface water over his own
premises, according to his own wants and interests, without obligation to
any proprietor either above or below.”125
Notably, once a court has adopted the common enemy doctrine (or the
civil rule alternative), the court applies the chosen rule, no matter what the
procedural posture of the case, i.e., whether it is brought in terms of enforc-
ing an easement, a claim for trespass, or a claim of negligence or nuisance.
As the Indiana Court of Appeals explained, “The common enemy doctrine
may apply regardless of the form of action brought by the plaintiff, that is,
regardless of whether the plaintiff asserts his claims as an action for negli-
120. Y.Z., A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE INTENDED CANAL, FROM
CAMBRIDGE TO THE RIVER STORT 12 (n.p., 1788).
121. Crowel v. Marshall Cnty. Drainage Bd., 971 N.E.2d 638, 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
122. Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. 106, 107 (1865).
123. Argyelan v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973, 975 (Ind. 1982); see 6 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 109, § 50.20(g) (“Under one rule, called the ‘common enemy’ rule, the
diffused surface water is considered to be the common enemy, and each landowner is deemed
to be entitled to protect himself, regardless of the consequences to others.”).
124. Johnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698, 700 (Me. 1978).
125. Morrison v. Bucksport & Bangor R.R. Co., 67 Me. 353, 355 (1877).
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gence, trespass, or nuisance.”126 The common enemy doctrine, therefore,
remains a unique feature of water law applicable to causes of action arising
in various circumstances, so long as the waters in question can accurately be
described as surface waters.
There are a number of common exceptions to the doctrine, and several
jurisdictions have adopted more than one of these exceptions.127 One
method of adopting the common enemy approach is to add meliorating lan-
guage within the traditional rule by making reference to a reasonableness
standard. For example, Minnesota notes, “Each possessor [of land] is legally
privileged to make a reasonable use of his land, even though the flow of
surface waters is altered thereby and causes some harm to others.”128 The
addition of the key qualifier some allows the court to incorporate a reasona-
bleness tort standard to soften the traditional rule. Thus, in Minnesota, the
landowner “incurs liability only when his harmful interference with the flow
of surface water is unreasonable.”129 Similarly, California has determined
that the particular protective measures adopted by the landowner must be
reasonable.130
Other jurisdictions have adopted the common enemy rule, but have
softened its application with an exception for unnecessary injury. Arkansas
courts, for example, have found that the right to expel surface waters is
contingent on avoiding “unnecessary injury” to the neighbor.131 There, the
landowner responsible for increased water flow is not responsible “unless
injury is unnecessarily inflicted upon another which, by reasonable effort
and expense, could be avoided.”132
Courts have also blended the reasonableness qualification with a more
general negligence approach for a further variation on the original rule. For
example, in Missouri, “surface water may be treated as a common enemy
and no liability attaches where the flow of surface water is obstructed, so
long as it is done reasonably and not in a reckless or negligent manner.”133
In these jurisdictions, the case law tends to make much more frequent refer-
ence to traditional tort standards for determining liability. Negligence in-
126. Kinsel v. Schoen, 934 N.E.2d 133, 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
127. See Pruitt v. Douglas County, 66 P.3d 1111, 1116 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
128. Sachs v. Chiat, 162 N.W.2d 243, 246–47 (Minn. 1968) (emphasis added) (citing
Stanley Kinyon & Robert McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891,
904 (1940)).
129. Id.
130. See Linvill v. Perello, 234 Cal. Rptr. 392, 394–95 (Ct. App. 1987); see also Beckley
v. Reclamation Bd., 23 Cal. Rptr. 428, 434 (Ct. App. 1962).
131. Boyd v. Greene County, 644 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983).
132. McCoy v. Bd. of Dirs., 129 S.W. 1097, 1099 (Ark. 1910).
133. Thomas v. Ducat, 769 S.W.2d 819, 820 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
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troduces a higher burden of proof than would otherwise be included if, for
example, the problem of surface water were simply treated as a trespass.
Other jurisdictions have introduced a negligence concept without incor-
porating a reasonableness criterion. One example of such a rule instead in-
corporates a “due care” standard: “Under the common enemy doctrine,
landowners who alter the flow of surface water are shielded from liability
only if they exercise their rights with due care by acting in good faith and
avoiding unnecessary damage to the property of others.”134
At other times, courts have made it clear that the adoption of the com-
mon enemy doctrine does not prevent application of the law of negli-
gence.135 Instead, the common enemy doctrine would simply provide one
measure of the reasonableness of a landowner’s actions when the jury is
determining the standard of ordinary care. Additionally, negligence causes
of action are sometimes incorporated by attacking the process of construc-
tion—i.e., by alleging that a bridge, levee, etc. was constructed negligently,
thereby causing the additional risk of flooding.136
The American Law Institute has adopted a similar view, looking for
negligent, reckless, or ultra-hazardous conduct to support liability.137 Addi-
tional rules apply where there is an intentional invasion. In those circum-
stances, the question is whether the invasion was reasonable.138
Similarly, other jurisdictions have incorporated a good faith standard
into their variation of the common enemy doctrine. In those jurisdictions,
“[a] landowner will not be liable for damages to abutting property caused by
the flow of surface water due to improvements to his or her land provided
that the improvements were made in good faith to fit the property for some
rational use.”139
While each of the exceptions or variations discussed thus far apply to
the general rule, jurisdictions have also created exceptions that apply only to
particular landscape features. For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court
declined to apply the rule where the surface water gathered naturally within
a depression.140
Additionally, courts embracing the common enemy doctrine have fre-
quently adopted an exception specific to collecting and releasing surface
134. Pruitt v. Douglas County, 66 P.3d 1111, 1114 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
135. See Linvill, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
136. See Abbott v. Kan. City, Saint Joseph & Council Bluffs R.R. Co., 83 Mo. 271, 277
(1884) (alleging a cause of “misfeasance, or the construction of said bridge in a negligent and
unskillful manner”).
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 833 (AM . LAW INST. 1979).
138. Id.
139. Gollomp v. Dubbs, 725 N.Y.S.2d 219, 220 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
140. Romshek v. Osantowski, 466 N.W.2d 482, 496 (Neb. 1991).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA102.txt unknown Seq: 25 23-DEC-15 11:08
Fall 2015] Surface Water Liability 97
water such that it flows across neighboring lands.141 One court stated, “The
neighbor above cannot gather water in great quantities and put it off in a
different place, but he is allowed to let it go as it would naturally go,
whether it be a spring or the natural rain water that falls on the lot.”142
Similarly, Indiana has adopted the common enemy rule, but modified the
rule to “not allow a landowner to ‘collect or concentrate surface water and
cast it, in a body, upon his [or her] neighbor.’ ”143 In a related approach,
some courts have also chosen not to favor defendants who “drained onto the
other property by artificial means, such as pipes and ditches.”144
Courts have repeatedly considered whether, if the common enemy doc-
trine is adopted by a state, it should also extend to urban landscapes. More
generally, nuisance law tends to be applied differently in urban and rural
landscapes because of the importance of landscape context in determining
the reasonableness of a landowner’s actions.145
C. The Civil Law Rule
The civil law rule is nicely summarized in a Louisiana case: “[T]he
owner of land may do on his estate whatever he pleases subject to the limi-
tation that he cannot cause his neighbor damage in so doing . . . .” Indeed,
“the neighbor may be put to some inconvenience,” but not so much as would
“actually damage the adjoining property.”146
It is rare for a civil law rule to continue without modification.147 Devel-
opment pressures have allowed “the upper owner to make modifications in
the drainage pattern and even to accelerate the flow of water so long as the
changes are not substantial or do not unreasonably or negligently cause
harm to the lower owner.”148 As this formulation suggests, courts have al-
tered the rule by the introduction of a reasonableness or negligence stan-
dard, similar to the modifications of the common enemy doctrine. A
common modern approach is that “[n]atural drainage conditions may be
141. Belveal v. H.B.C. Dev. Co., 279 S.W.2d 545, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
142. McMahon v. Thornton, 5 Pa. Super. 495, 502 (1897).
143. Crowel v. Marshall Cnty. Drainage Bd., 971 N.E.2d 638, 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
144. Gollomp, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 229; see also Cottrell v. Hermon, 566 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742
(App. Div. 1991) (stating that liability does not exist in “the absence of any proof that the
defendant utilized pipes, drains or ditches”).
145. See Alan Romero, Rural Property Law, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 765, 766–67 (2010) (ex-
plaining the general rule for nuisance and variations in its application based on urban and
rural landscapes).
146. Ernst v. H.H. Burstein Enters., 379 So. 2d 852, 853 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
147. Garbarino v. Van Cleave, 330 P.2d 28, 31 (Or. 1958).
148. 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 109, § 50.20.
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altered by an upper proprietor provided the water is not sent down in [a]
manner or quantity to do more harm than formerly.”149
Courts have also modified the civil law rule through the addition of a
good husbandry exception, which adds a particular inclination toward pre-
ferring development (or at least development that is arguably well exe-
cuted).150 As the Oregon Supreme Court has explained, this option is now
quite popular.151
D. The Reasonableness Rule
While some jurisdictions still formulate their approach to surface water
liability in terms of the traditional doctrines (albeit often with qualifying
language such as “some” or “reasonably”), other jurisdictions have com-
pletely replaced the traditional rules with a general rule of reasonable-
ness.152 The distinction is important. For example, in a civil law rule
jurisdiction that has incorporated a reasonableness modification, the civil
law rule still includes the idea of an easement on the lower-lying lands cre-
ated by the natural flow of waters.153 Any determination of what is reasona-
ble in terms of new burdens for landowners will assume the preexisting
burden of the easement. In contrast, a jurisdiction adopting a general rea-
sonableness rule does not begin by assuming that burden on the lower
lands.154
As summarized in its adoption in New Hampshire, the reasonable use
rule states, “[T]he sole ground of qualification of the landowner’s right of
drainage was the similar rights of others, the extent of the qualification
being determined under the rule of reasonable use, and the rights of each
landowner being similar . . . .”155 The reasonableness rule may also incorpo-
149. Hankins v. Borland, 431 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Colo. 1967).
150. See generally infra Subsection III.B.2.
151. Garbarino, 330 P.2d at 31.
152. As one court put it, a modern court has to decide whether to “adhere to the ‘com-
mon enemy’ doctrine in respect to surface waters, or abandon it in favor of the ‘reasonable
use’ doctrine, as numerous other jurisdictions have done.” State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407,
409 (Wis. 1974).
153. As Thompson on Real Property explains, “Although the rule has been modified, the
lower landowner is still considered to be burdened with a drainage easement in favor of the
upper landowner and must receive the water.” 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 109,
§ 50.20(g).
154. Courts following the general approach simply refuse to recognize the “natural ease-
ment” postulated by the civil law rule. For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held
that “[a]t common law there exists no easement or servitude in the premises of the lower
landowner in favor of the owner of the higher land as to surface water which falls or accumu-
lates by rain or the melting of snow.” Town of Jefferson v. Hicks, 102 P. 79, 80 (Okla. 1909).
155. Fairchild, supra note 111, at 1216.
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rate a type of negligence standard. For example, in determining the reasona-
bleness of the defendant’s actions, a court might ask whether the
construction process was carried out with ordinary care.156
E. Special Rules for Special Geography
1. Raising the Landscape and the Natural Flow Rule
Courts may engage the question of liability without reference to either
of the two traditional approaches to surface water where one party has em-
barked upon generally elevating its land to the detriment of a neighbor.157
In such circumstances, courts may apply rules specific to elevating or grad-
ing the landscape.
A large number of cases arise over the elevation of land, particularly
within urban areas. Jurisdictions following the common enemy doctrine are
split over whether the elevation of land should result in liability for surface
water runoff.158 Notably, courts are not only divided on whether an excep-
tion should be made for elevated land, but also whether the exception
should apply equally in all types of landscapes (ranging from urban to rural
to agricultural).159
Before examining how the two traditional rules may apply to the eleva-
tion of land, it should be noted that not all courts adopt rules specific to
these circumstances. Some courts address these cases within the context of
the general approach to surface waters within their jurisdiction.160 If the
common enemy rule were applied strictly, there would be no liability for
elevating one’s parcel entirely.161 On the other hand, if the civil law rule
were applied, it is reasonably clear that the party elevating his or her land
would likely be causing damage to the neighbor and therefore would be
liable for those damages, provided they rose above mere inconvenience.162
156. See Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897, 904 (N.D. 1967) (examining the conduct
of the architect-engineer for ordinary care).
157. See Allen v. Morris Bldg. Co., 103 N.W.2d 491, 493 (Mich. 1960) (applying gen-
eral rules of intentional torts without relying on a surface water rule).
158. Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Liability for Diversion of Surface Water by Raising
Surface Level of Land, 88 A.L.R.4TH 891, 897–901 (1991).
159. Id.
160. See Ernst v. H.H. Burstein Enters., 379 So. 2d 852, 853 (La. Ct. App. 1980)
(applying the general statute, a civil law rule approach, which “provides the owner of land
may do on his estate whatever he pleases subject to the limitation that he cannot cause his
neighbor damage in so doing”).
161. Johnson v. Goodview Homes-1, Inc., 167 N.E.2d 132 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Summit
County 1960).
162. See 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 109, § 50.20(h). The lower owner
was obligated to receive water from the upper owner and the upper owner, in turn, was
obligated to neither increase the volume nor alter the flow of the water. While this rule was
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Rather than applying one of the two traditional rules, some courts con-
sider the act of raising the land to the detriment of a neighbor to be an
intentional tort. In Allen v. Morris Building Co., the Michigan Supreme
Court explained, “Plaintiffs were not required to prove defendants were
negligent or that their grading operations were in violation of city ordi-
nance or other law.”163 What mattered to the court was “the invasion of
[plaintiffs’] property rights . . . due to defendant’s intentional or positive
and continuous tort.”164 The defendants’ conduct constituted an intentional
tort because they “wilfully graded and built downspouts in the mentioned
fashion” and such actions damaged the plaintiff.165
Perhaps most commonly, courts have addressed the elevation of a parcel
by applying a rule of natural flow. The natural flow rule requires that the
lower parcel submit to the flow of water such as it naturally progresses
through the landscape.166 Alternatively stated, “the owner of land is entitled
to have surface water flow naturally over the land of the lower land owner,
and the lower owner cannot prevent escape of water from the higher land
onto his land.”167 The justifications for the rule seem to fall at the conjunc-
tion of a natural law approach and a “buyer beware” theory. As the New
York Court of Appeals explained in 1881, the primary considerations were
of the “order of nature,” which should not be subject to “unreasonable inter-
ruption.”168 Courts reasoned that due to the natural order of things, the
lower-lying parcel must accept the runoff of surface waters. Notably, this
meant that the plaintiff had no right of self-help either.169 The higher-lying
landowner had an affirmative right to divert waters “on the land of another
only through depressions, draws, or other drainways as they were wont to
flow in the state of nature.”170
less likely to cause harm to the lower owner, it greatly limited what one could do with the
land.
163. Allen v. Morris Bldg. Co., 103 N.W.2d 491, 493 (Mich. 1960).
164. Id. (citing McCullagh v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 69 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Mich.
1955)).
165. Id.
166. McMahon v. Thornton, 5 Pa. Super. 495, 502 (1897). Notably, Illinois has pre-
ferred the natural flow approach to surface water generally (not just in the context of the
elevation of land, as many other jurisdictions have applied the rule). ROBERT BECK, KEITH
HARRINGTON, WILLIAM P. HARDY & TIMOTHY FEATHER, ASSESSMENT OF ILLINOIS WATER QUANTITY
LAW app. A., at A27–28 (1996).
167. Biberman v. Funkhouser, 58 A.2d 668, 671 (Md. 1948).
168. Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140, 147 (1881).
169. Pickerill v. Louisville, 100 S.W. 873, 876 (Ky. 1907).
170. Nickerson Township v. Adams, 173 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Neb. 1970); see Nichol v.
Yocum, 113 N.W.2d 195, 201 (Neb. 1962) (“This court has recognized the right of an upper
proprietor to drain surface waters through a well-defined natural course, whether the course
be ditch, swale, or drain in its primitive condition, and that such flow cannot be arrested or
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The natural flow rule does not precisely align with either traditional
approach to surface water liability. The natural flow approach roughly coor-
dinates with the civil law rule, although the natural flow rule goes further in
establishing the rights of the higher-elevated landowner by establishing
something along the lines of an easement for the passage of water.171 In-
deed, at times courts have conceived of the natural flow approach as an
easement—one created by the natural flow of waters meeting the criteria for
an easement by prescription.172 Thus, the natural flow of waters is often
described using the vocabulary of easements: “The owner of the lower, or
servient, estate must receive surface water from the upper, or dominant, es-
tate, in its natural flow.”173 These terms, servient and dominant estates, de-
scribe the quintessential features of an easement in property law.
Most notably, the easement must “be acquired by an uninterrupted en-
joyment”174 for the statutory period provided within that jurisdiction—gen-
erally fifteen to twenty years. Because of this requirement, when the natural
flow rule is adopted as an easement, such easements will correspond to the
historically normal height of the water. Flooding beyond that level may still
constitute a nuisance.175
With respect to the common enemy doctrine, there is no priority for
either the higher-lying or lower-lying parcel or the natural flow of waters.
Under the strictest formulation of the common enemy doctrine, a land-
owner could repel surface waters and discharge them onto a neighboring
parcel no matter the consequences to the neighbor.176 For a lower elevated
interfered with to the injury of neighboring proprietors.”). There are, of course, limits to the
natural flow rule as well: “[T]he upper owner has no right to increase materially the quantity
or volume of water discharged on the lower landowner.” Biberman, 58 A.2d at 671.
171. Some courts have explicitly connected the civil law rule with the establishment of
an easement based on the natural flow of water. South Dakota, for example, describes the
civil law rule, which it has adopted for rural surface water drainage, as creating “an easement
under which the dominant, or upper property owner may reasonably discharge surface water
over the servient estate through natural watercourses.” Hendrickson v. Wagners, Inc., 598
N.W.2d 507, 510 (S.D. 1999) (quoting Knodel v. Kassel Township, 581 N.W.2d 504, 507
(S.D. 1998)).
172. Easements may arise based on natural flows of water, but it is important to note
that they can also be created through the continued use of an artificially created watercourse.
“It is generally recognized that drainage rights in the nature of prescriptive easements may
accrue in artificial channels if they are enjoyed by an upper proprietor for the statutory
period of limitation.” Minton v. Steakley, 466 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (citing
6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.63, at 190 (A.J. Casner ed., 1954)).
173. Rynestad v. Clemetson, 133 N.W.2d 559, 563 (N.D. 1965) (emphasis added).
174. JOSEPH KINNICUT ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE COMMON LAW IN RELATION TO WATER-
COURSES 70 (Boston, Wells & Lilly 1824).
175. Id. at 70–71.
176. Roberts v. Hocker, 610 S.W.2d 321, 326 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
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landowner, this would mean that the common enemy doctrine directly con-
tradicted the natural flow rule: the lower parcel would not be obligated to
accept waters from above and could, without regard for the consequences,
prevent the water from entering the parcel.
One version of the natural flow rule adopts a negligence approach to
determine whether one property owner exposed “others to an unreasonable
risk of harm.”177 In Tennessee, for example, the plaintiff can only succeed
under the natural flow rule by showing “not only that the defendant was
guilty of negligence but that such negligence was one of the proximate
causes of the injuries complained of.”178
Whether a court follows the general surface water rule or adopts a rule
specific to parcels elevated through improvements, the court may also
choose to vary the rule depending on whether the landscape context is ur-
ban or rural. Where courts have adopted the rule of natural flow to address
parcel elevation, courts may choose not to apply the rule in the urban con-
text. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court explained in 1897, “[w]hen you
come to small lots in a city, laid out as this is, then the rule changes, and the
party below is not bound to submit to that flow of water. He may dam it
up.”179
Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals explained that the general
rule was that “[t]he owner of a city lot is not, indeed, obliged to keep his
ground at its natural or former level, and may turn back upon an adjoining
lot water the natural inclination of which would be to run down upon his
own lot.”180 The court was concerned with mediating the parties’ needs in
the context of fostering local development. Thus, the court explained, “The
necessity of building is great, but no greater than the carrying on of many
trades which tend to interfere with the comfort of those in whose vicinity
they are carried on.”181 Thus, outside of urban centers, a lower landowner
may protect himself from surface water by building a levee if doing so is a
practical method of protecting against surface water, and if by constructing
a levee, the lower proprietor acts in good faith and without negligence.182
In Illinois, where the natural flow rule is particularly important because
it is applied to surface water cases more generally, there are multiple adap-
tations to provide for urban and rural contexts. Within rural lands, Illinois
softens the rule for the enterprising farmer who protects his land from sur-
177. Brown v. City of Kingsport, 711 S.W.2d 607, 608 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
178. Id.
179. McMahon v. Thornton, 5 Pa. Super. 495, 496 (1897).
180. Freudenstein v. Heine, 6 Mo. App. 287, 290–91 (1878).
181. Id.
182. Timmons v. Clayton, 259 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Ark. 1953).
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face waters, adopting a “ ‘good husbandry’ exception, thereby permitting an
upper landowner to interfere with natural drainage provided that the inter-
ference was incidental to the reasonable development of the land for agri-
cultural purposes.”183 This preference for economically beneficial
development within agriculture has expanded to more urban contexts as
well.184
2. Adopting Both Traditional Surface Water Doctrines,
Depending on Whether the Landscape
Is Urban or Rural
To add to the confusion in dealing with surface waters, some courts
have chosen to adopt both the traditional common enemy doctrine and the
civil law rule, applying one for urban areas and the other for rural areas.
Ohio courts, for example, have utilized both rules, applying the com-
mon enemy doctrine to urban areas and the civil rule to rural areas.185 To
promote development within the city, courts have found it advisable to pro-
tect the investment of the owner who has chosen to divert the natural flow
of water to protect his business.186 Indeed, one Ohio judge went so far as to
observe that “the plaintiff here could have taken the matter in his own
hands, and could have cast said water back upon the defendant’s land, and if
he did so in a reasonable manner, the defendant company could not com-
plain, or hold the plaintiff liable therefor.”187
Similarly, Kansas, which initially applied the common enemy doctrine,
partially switched to the civil law rule. As the Kansas Supreme Court ex-
plained, “The act of 1911 . . . abolishing the common-law rule and substitut-
ing therefor the rule of the civil law with respect to surface waters applies
only to lands used for agricultural purposes and highways lying wholly
outside the limits of any incorporated city.”188
In 1904, the Alabama Supreme Court refused to apply the previously
adopted civil law rule in a new case, finding instead that “[t]he rule adopted
in this State from the civil law, which in general makes land legally sub-
servient to the natural flowage of surface water, does not apply under the
artificial conditions created by the building of cities and the improvement
of city lots.”189 As the court explained in 1974, “this court early took the
183. BECK, supra note 166.
184. Id.




188. Liston v. Scott, 194 P. 642, 643 (Kan. 1921) (emphasis added).
189. Hall v. Rising, 37 So. 586, 587 (Ala. 1904).
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position that the civil law rule should not apply in cities, but instead
adopted the ‘common enemy’ doctrine for incorporated areas.”190
One reason for adopting different rules for urban and rural landscapes
arises from the difficulty of determining the original natural flow. The
problem is that “at least with respect to urban property where conditions are
constantly changing,” it can be “generally difficult or even impossible to
establish how surface water flowed ‘when untouched and undirected by the
hand of man.’”191 Given how very different some urban landscapes are com-
pared to their pre-urban existence (compare, for example, marshy Manhat-
tan island and the current 5th Avenue), there is some merit to this
explanation.
Other courts have considered and explicitly rejected maintaining dis-
tinct approaches to urban and rural lands. In Tennessee, for example, the
Supreme Court explained, “We are unable to see any difference in principle
between the reciprocal rights and duties of adjacent urban proprietors and
those of adjacent rural proprietors.”192
III. NAVIGATING SURFACE WATER LIABILITY IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
This final part addresses the need for reform. This need stems, to a
large extent, from the tangle of rules that have evolved over the last century.
Section III.A explains how, as a result of the proliferation of exceptions to
the standard rules and the contextual adaptations of the rules, surface water
liability has become rather difficult to navigate. This is problematic not only
in terms of the complexity of the case law, which hampers public under-
standing of the rules, but also because liability has become unpredictable.
Section III.B tackles a more important reason why surface law needs
reform. Current rules foster drainage and the destruction of wetlands,
which contributes to climate change in multiple ways. Additionally, the de-
struction of wetlands exacerbates climate change related issues, such as
storm surges and sea level rise. It is relatively easy to see how deeply the
British approach to land management influenced the common enemy rule
and how the common enemy rule fosters drainage. Other modern variations
on that rule, however, are not necessarily any less problematic in terms of
climate change. This section examines many of the modern rules and their
190. Mountain Brook v. Beatty, 295 So. 2d 388, 392 (Ala. 1974).
191. Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex. 1968).
192. Garland v. Aurin, 53 S.W. 940, 941 (Tenn. 1899). In another related variation,
California has adopted the same rule for both urban and rural lands. However, courts have
also said that the rule must be tailored to the particular landscape context within each case.
Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 535–36 (Cal. 1966).
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impacts on land management practices. This section argues that surface
water rules carry with them a long history of a particular view of land—one
deeply influenced by the British approach to land management, which
emerged from contemporaneous agricultural science. Rather than re-exam-
ining our rules in light of changing scientific knowledge, we have allowed
the weight of precedent to keep even scientifically outdated rules in place.
Finally, Section III.C proposes a new rule: a single rule of landscape-
specific reasonableness. Such a rule would support the reasonable expecta-
tions of the landowner with respect to development, but could also advance
the public good through maximizing sustainability when the most benefit
can be gained at the least cost. Such a landscape-specific rule would favor
development within areas that are already highly developed, while disfavor-
ing development in landscapes that remain closer to their natural state. The
point of such a rule would be to maximize economic opportunities where
there are relatively few gains to be had from the landscape for climate
health, but then maximize climate health where there are significant poten-
tial gains to be had from maintaining an entirely or largely undeveloped
landscape. While acknowledging that surface water liability rules are not, of
course, our only route to protecting wetlands or to managing land use, I
argue that the case law implicates large-scale social issues that deserve
thoughtful attention—attention that has often been paid in other property
and tort contexts.
A. Complex Litigation and Complications from
Pro-Development Influences
As a result of the proliferation of exceptions to the standard rules, and
the contextual adaptations of the rules, there is a great deal of complexity to
litigating a surface water liability case. Liability is, simply put, rather unpre-
dictable. As the Indiana Supreme Court explained, the two original
doctrines
[a]re harsh but have the common virtue of predictability. Under
them, landowners know where they stand. They know what they
may do and what they may not do without incurring severe risks. If
at times the doctrines work to one’s disadvantage, there are other
times when he reaps its benefits.193
The doctrine of reasonable use is quite the opposite of the two original
doctrines. “Its advantage is flexibility. Its disadvantage, obviously[,] is its
193. Argyelan v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973, 975 (Ind. 1982).
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unpredictability.”194 Dobbins has argued that this unpredictability is a fatal
flaw despite the “theoretical superiority” of the rule. Dobbins argued that
the rule leaves citizens risking “a law suit each time such an improvement is
constructed”; as a result “a prudent man might well be required to seek a
declaratory judgment.”195
Of course, some approaches are much more practically workable and
predictable than others. Oklahoma’s rule, for example, is sufficiently ab-
stract as to offer ample opportunities for unpredictability:
This court has long given its approval to the “Common Enemy
Doctrine” in a modified and restricted sense. In cases approving
same we have said that each proprietor may divert the water, cast it
back or pass it along to the next proprietor, provided he can do so
without injury to such adjoining proprietor. However, in all such
cases we have laid down the rule that no one is permitted to sacri-
fice his neighbor’s property in order to protect his own.196
Additionally, it is important to note that many of the complexities of
this line of jurisprudence result from courts adopting specific pro-develop-
ment policies. Arkansas’ rule separates city property from agricultural areas.
Acknowledging the need to build within cities, the Arkansas rule grants the
owner a wide berth to fill, elevate, drain, and generally prevent surface
water from gathering on his land, even if that means preventing water from
flowing onto his land. The Arkansas Supreme Court has embraced such a
lenient rule in cities because “[a] contrary rule would operate against the
advancement and progress of cities and towns and to their injury, and
would be against public policy.”197
Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court concluded that alterations
to the two traditional rules of surface water liability arose inevitably in re-
sponse to modern social conditions. The court found that
[b]oth the civil and the common law rules, even as modified, are
too inflexible to meet the demands of an urban society. The devel-
opment of land for commercial, industrial, and housing complexes
requires alteration of the property. If this is to occur, an owner
must be able to take reasonable steps to develop property without
being subjected to suit.198
194. Id. at 976.
195. Donald V. Dobbins, Surface Water Drainage, 36 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 518, 526
(1961).
196. Gregory v. Bogdanoff, 307 P.2d 841, 843 (Okla. 1957).
197. Levy v. Nash, 112 S.W. 173, 174 (Ark. 1908).
198. Morris Assocs. v. Priddy, 383 S.E.2d 770, 773 (W. Va. 1989).
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Thus, not only did the court conclude that the two original doctrines had
morphed to suit the modern need for development (which the court as-
sumed to be a positive thing), but the court additionally found that even
these modifications of the traditional rules were not sufficient to “meet the
demands” of modern development.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has been more cautious in simply
adopting pro-development policies, although for fairness reasons rather
than because of environmental concerns. The court acknowledged “society
has a great interest that land shall be developed for the greater good.”199 On
the other hand, the court concluded, “no reason suggests itself why, in jus-
tice, the economic costs incident to the expulsion of surface waters in the
transformation of the rural or semi-rural areas of our State into urban or
suburban communities should be borne in every case by adjoining landown-
ers.”200 Notably, the court begins its musings with the assumption that a
pro-development policy is in the best interests of everyone involved—the
question is simply who should bear the costs.201
B. Applying Current Rules Reinforces Pro-Development, Pro-
Drainage Ideology and Advances the Trajectory
of a Changing Climate
Does surface water liability—the liability of one landowner for waters
flowing onto the land of a neighbor—contribute to climate change? Upon
hearing this question, legal scholars likely think first of nuisance. Creative
litigators have employed nuisance when seeking to hold corporations liable
for their roles in climate change, a move that might (if slowly) influence
future climate change. Few if any such cases have succeeded to any degree.
What, then, of the evidence for the opposite conclusion, that nuisance law
(and, more specifically here, surface water liability) exacerbates climate
change?
To answer that question, we must pause to look more closely at the
environmental consequences of drainage, in terms of both sustainability and
climate change. Wetlands provide substantial environmental services,202
199. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 10 (N.J. 1956).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 872 (2005) (discussing the general approach of quantifying the many
services that natural areas provide to humans and, specifically, discussing the service that
wetlands provide in terms of water retention and purification); J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance
Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 757 (2008) (describing the many ecological services
provided by wetlands, particularly those that are relevant in the context of climate change).
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such as fostering unique habitats and biodiversity,203 and providing a natu-
ral filtration system for water.204 In terms of climate change, however, wet-
lands play a very specific role. First, the destruction of wetlands contributes
to climate change through substantial releases of stored carbon.205 Second,
the destruction of the natural habitat eliminates the wetland as a natural
device for carbon sequestration.206 Draining and clearing wetlands deals a
double blow: it releases a backlog of stored carbon dating back centuries,
and it destroys future capacity for carbon sequestration.207
Simultaneously, drainage deals another blow on the climate front. In-
tact wetlands offer substantial mitigation benefits to nearby communities
confronting the impacts of climate change. Wetlands protect coastal com-
munities from storm surges and also mitigate both the effects of flooding
and of sea level rise.208 Destroying wetlands exacerbates the painful symp-
toms of climate change, particularly for coastal communities.209
For much the same reasons, drainage is not a very sustainable pattern
for land use; destroying wetlands carries important long-term effects on the
environment, particularly an environment already suffering from climate
change.
203. See Paul Stanton Kibel, Climate Adaptation Policy at the Continental Level: Natural
Resources in North America and Europe, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 473, 493–95 (2010) (discussing
the potential threats to threatened wetland wildlife and habitats due to sea level rise).
204. See EPA Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Mate-
rial, 40 C.F.R. § 230.41(b) (describing wetlands as providing natural filtration services);
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, EPA 843-F-06-004, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WET-
LANDS (May 2006), http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/EconomicBenefits
.pdf (discussing the many economic services wetlands provide to communities); Barton H.
Thompson, Markets for Nature, 25 WM . & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 295 (2000)
(discussing the multiple ways riparian lands promote water quality).
205. For further discussion of wetlands and carbon sequestration and release, see
Nicholas A. Fromherz, The Case for a Global Treaty on Soil Conservation, Sustainable Farming,
and the Preservation of Agrarian Culture, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 57, 71 (2012).
206. Id. at 70–71 & n.74.
207. For further discussion of wetlands and carbon sequestration and release, see id. at
70–71.
208. See Denis J. Brion, The Unresolved Structure of Property Rights in the Virginia Shore, 24
WM . & MARY L. REV. 727, 729 (1983) (describing the benefits of tidal marshes for nearby
areas including buffering against storms and absorbing floodwaters both from surges/sea
level rise and upland rains); Noah D. Hall, Interstate Water Compacts and Climate Change
Adaptation, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 237, 248 (2010) (citing the destruction of wet-
lands as “accelerating harms” of climate change).
209. Notably, Doug Kysar and Thomas McGarity have pointed out that the National
Environmental Policy Act may not deal very effectively with addressing these attributes of
wetlands in a cost-benefit analysis. Douglas A. Kysar & Thomas O. McGarity, Did NEPA
Drown New Orleans? The Levees, the Blame Game, and the Hazards of Hindsight, 56 DUKE L.J.
179, 230–31 (2006).
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It is relatively easy to see how deeply the British approach to land man-
agement influenced the common enemy rule and how the common enemy
rule fosters drainage. That said, however, the common enemy approach con-
tinues in full force in only a limited number of jurisdictions. Therefore, to
consider the impact of modern surface water liability cases on climate
change, this section focuses on the land management impacts of the reason-
ableness rule, which many jurisdictions have embraced to replace the com-
mon enemy and civil law rules. It also looks at some of the most common
exceptions to those rules.
1. Reasonableness
In recent years, a reasonableness approach has thrived and often re-
placed the common enemy doctrine. In some cases, courts have adopted the
reasonableness approach precisely because the court concluded that this
method of determining surface water liability was “the one most likely to
promote the optimum development and enjoyment of land.”210
Even when not adopted explicitly to promote development, courts may
find that the reasonableness approach naturally favors development through
the doctrine’s flexible, fact-specific approach. When it comes to parsing rea-
sonableness, some courts simply state the rule, elaborating no specific fac-
tors but rather simply stating, “[W]hat is reasonable in such cases depends
upon the special facts of each particular case.”211 Other courts elaborate a
list of factors, including “the amount of harm caused, the foreseeability of
the harm on the part of the possessor making the alteration in the flow, the
purpose or motive with which he acted, and others.”212
Many of the factors considered when examining reasonableness provide
immediate preference to the priorities of greater development and land-
scape change. For example, Minnesota favors additional development that
conforms to existing patterns in the area. The Supreme Court of Minnesota
has said, “Any determination of whether a possessor has made a reasonable
use of his land requires a consideration of the normal use and development
of land in the immediate area or locality.”213 Minnesota courts adopt this
approach because “[c]ommon experience and knowledge have demonstrated
that in order to prepare urban property for its customary use and enjoy-
210. Heins Implement Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 691
(Mo. 1993).
211. Hopkins v. Taylor, 151 N.W. 194, 194 (Minn. 1915).
212. Sachs v. Chiat, 162 N.W.2d 243, 246–47 (Minn. 1968).
213. Id.
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ment, it is frequently necessary to level, raise, lower, or otherwise alter the
ground surface.”214
Another court has said, “The rule requires the application of a balancing
test whereby the benefit to the dominant estate is balanced against the harm
done to the servient estate.”215 In such cases, it is often easier to quantify
the benefits of development versus the benefits of leaving land in an unde-
veloped state. It is also often likely that the benefits to a developed parcel
are economically far greater than the detriments to a non-developed, neigh-
boring parcel, which may be a wetland.
One of the oft-praised virtues of the reasonableness approach is its flex-
ibility in addressing individual situations. This same flexibility, however, is
an invitation to consider many development-related factors such as the cost
of investments and the social goods created by the use of developed lands in
terms of additional revenues, products, and so forth. Often the standard is
described very broadly, requiring “a consideration of all the relevant circum-
stances, including such factors as the amount of harm caused, the foresee-
ability of the harm which results, the purpose or motive with which the
possessor acted, and all other relevant matter.”216 Such approaches are often
explicitly combined with a pro-development ethic.217
2. Good Husbandry
The good husbandry exception (applied in civil rule and common law
rule jurisdictions) also favors development. More specifically, the good hus-
bandry exception favors drainage,218 falling precisely in line with the tradi-
tional British ideology of land improvement. Indeed, courts have found that
the good husbandry rule developed “because agriculture required the drain-
ing of marshy land.”219 Under the good husbandry rule, the owner of the
upper land may accelerate the flow of surface water by such drainage system
“as may be required by good husbandry, without liability for damages to the
owner of the lower lands if the water is not diverted from its natural chan-
214. Id.
215. Dovin v. Winfield Township., 517 N.E.2d 1119, 1125 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987), overruled
on other grounds by Gerill v. Jack L. Hargrove Bldrs., 538 N.E.2d 530 (Ill. 1989).
216. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 10 (N.J. 1956).
217. Id. (“It is, of course, true that society has a great interest that land shall be devel-
oped for the greater good. It is therefore properly a consideration in these cases whether the
utility of the possessor’s use of his land outweighs the gravity of the harm which results from
his alteration of the flow of surface waters.”).
218. The rule is often stated in terms of the landowner’s need to “make such drains, for
agricultural purposes, on his own land, as may be required by good husbandry.” Peck v.
Herrington, 109 Ill. 611, 619 (1884).
219. Shulte v. Flowers, 983 N.E.2d. 1124, 1129 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
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nels.”220 The justification given is simply that to “drain [the] land of surface
water for agricultural purposes” is necessarily “an act of good husbandry”
and therefore the party should have the right to make such improvements
without liability.221 Courts have therefore ruled in favor of an “undoubted
right” to “drain lagoons,” even when the neighboring property suffers ad-
verse consequences.222 Courts have found such acts to be “in the interest of
good husbandry, and in the good-faith improvement and tillage of [a]
farm.”223 Drainage of land is simply “the proper improvement of the surface
of the ground.”224 Or, as the North Carolina Supreme Court explained, “in
the interest of health and good husbandry better drainage is to be en-
couraged.”225 The justification for this approach is identical to the original
justification for the common law rule: “surface water is a common enemy”
and should be drained “in the interest of good husbandry.”226
Additionally, while there are limits to this pro-drainage approach, lia-
bility exists only where the conduct of the defendant is negligent227 or even
“reckless” or “needless,” creating a rather high standard for relief.228 Often
courts state the rule rather strongly in favor of the right of drainage. For
example, the Mississippi Supreme Court observed:
[T]he upper owner may reasonably drain his surface waters into the
natural watercourse, in good husbandry, and this right may be exer-
cised by him without any qualification or limit; and if he thereby
increase the flow of the stream beyond its capacity, which results in
flooding and damaging the lower owner, such damage will be
damnum absque injuria; damage without legal injury, for which no
right of action will lie.229
220. Garbarino v. Van Cleave, 330 P.2d 28, 31 (Or. 1958).
221. Dudley Special Rd. Dist. v. Harrison, 517 S.W.2d 170, 180 (Mo. 1974) (quoting
Young v. Moore, 36 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951)).
222. Stuthman v. Hull Trust, 447 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Neb. 1989) (quoting Todd v. York
County, 100 N.W. 299, 305 (Neb. 1904)).
223. Gregory v. Bush, 31 N.W. 90, 93 (Mich. 1887).
224. Gene B. Glick Co. v. Marion Constr. Corp., 331 N.E.2d 26, 31 (Ind. Ct. App.
1975).
225. Briscoe v. Parker, 58 S.E. 443, 444 (N.C. 1907).
226. Erickson v. Tyler, 186 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Neb. 1971).
227. Todd, 100 N.W. at 300. Alternatively, some courts formulate the limit as “unreason-
able inconvenience.” Levene v. Salem, 229 P.2d 255, 260 (Or. 1951).
228. Dudley Special Rd. Dist. v. Harrison, 517 S.W.2d 170, 180 (Mo. 1974) (quoting
Young v. Moore, 36 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951)).
229. Bd. of Drainage Comm’rs v. Bd. of Drainage Comm’rs, 95 So. 75, 79 (Miss. 1922).
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Because the damage is caused by a reasonable use, although “perhaps some-
what enlarged in the interests of agriculture and the improvement of lands,”
the injured landowner “must submit to any resulting inconvenience.”230
The good husbandry rule is somewhat impervious to other judicial
grappling with the complexities of surface water liability because the rule
often exists within statutes. Nebraska, for example, has maintained the good
husbandry rule for drainage via statute.231 Similarly, Illinois enacted the
good husbandry rule within its Drainage Code.232
The impact of the good husbandry rule has expanded significantly as
courts have taken it beyond the agricultural context. Some courts have con-
cluded that “[a]lthough the good husbandry exception developed to promote
agriculture . . . the general principle applies to urban and suburban set-
tings.”233 The exception would then apply “regardless of whether it was
caused by diversion from another watershed, the installation of septic tanks,
the grading and paving of streets, or the construction of houses, basements
and appurtenances”; the determination would simply turn upon whether the
activities were “consistent with the policy of reasonableness of use which led
initially to the good-husbandry exception.”234
3. Social Utility
Social utility refers not simply to the usefulness of the landscape altera-
tion to the defendant, but rather more generally to the overall social utility
of the defendant’s activities.235 As a result, social utility goes beyond balanc-
ing the interests of the two parties to considering the utility of the defen-
dant’s conduct for society as a whole.236
In surface water cases, social utility is determined through multiple ap-
proaches and mechanisms. Social utility forms a significant part of any rea-
sonableness analysis, but “a fact finder must still determine the
reasonableness of an actor’s conduct in relation to the plaintiff, even if the
230. Gilfillan v. Schmidt, 66 N.W. 126, 129 (Minn. 1896).
231. NEB. REV. STAT. § 31-201 (2010).
232. See ILL. DRAINAGE CODE § 2-1 (2015).
233. Bollweg v. Richard Marker Assocs., 818 N.E.2d 873, 885 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
234. Templeton v. Huss, 311 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Ill. 1974).
235. As the court explains in Page Motor Co. v. Baker, the question is not merely the
“relative advantage to the actor and disadvantage to the adjoining landowners,” but also the
“social utility” of the activity. 438 A.2d 739, 741 (Conn. 1980).
236. Of course, considering social utility as a part of determining liability does not
necessarily mean that socially useful actions will not require compensation. The question
becomes whether “the gravity of the harm may be found to be so significant that it requires
compensation regardless of the utility of the conduct of the defendant.” Pendergrast v.
Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797 (N.C. 1977).
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conduct has social utility.”237 Alternatively, social utility may enter into the
court’s analysis through the basic mechanisms of the law of nuisance, which
may require consideration of the social utility of the defendant’s conduct.238
Additionally, variations on both the common enemy and civil law ap-
proaches may include considerations of social utility. For example, under
California’s modified civil law approach, courts must weigh the social utility
of the defendant’s conduct against the burden imposed on the neighboring
landowner.239
Naturally, land improvement and development tend to establish mone-
tarily quantifiable social goods such as new businesses, or more arable acres
of land. As a result, when courts decide issues of liability by calculating the
social utility of competing land uses, they inevitably end up favoring the
development imperatives of the day. The rationale is simply that “society
has an interest in developing land for general welfare.”240 For example,
courts have not hesitated to find that “today’s mass home building
projects . . . are assuredly in the social good.”241 Such calculations inevitably
reveal the temporal relativity of social utility as a benchmark, introducing a
constantly moving, pro-development target into property rights
jurisprudence.
4. Benefits and Burdens for Injunctions
As surface water questions sit uncomfortably at the intersection of
property, tort, and water law, at times the procedural posture of a case will
involve a request for injunctive relief. While the rules vary to some degree,
in general, injunction requests tend to involve some type of “balancing [of]
the equities,” where the court will weigh whether the “hardship to be suf-
fered by the [enjoined party is] . . . disproportionate to the . . . benefit to be
gained by the injured party.”242 Like the reasonableness rule, and for the
same reasons, this approach favors development imperatives: the economics
of development can be more easily proven and are more likely to weigh in
favor of the developing landowner.
237. Crest Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. v. Willemsen, 384 N.W.2d 692, 698
(Wis. 1986).
238. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM . LAW INST. 1979) (requiring consid-
eration of whether “the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s conduct”).
239. Sheffett v. County of Los Angeles, 84 Cal. Rptr. 11, 17 (Ct. App. 1970).
240. State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407, 414 (Wis. 1974).
241. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 10 (N.J. 1956).
242. Hendrickson v. Wagners, Inc., 598 N.W.2d 507, 511 (S.D. 1999) (citing Knodel v.
Kassel Township, 581 N.W.2d 504, 507 (S.D. 1998)).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA102.txt unknown Seq: 42 23-DEC-15 11:08
114 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 5:1
5. Split Rules for Urban/Rural Landscapes
As we have seen, where courts have decided to split rules for urban and
rural landscapes, those choices have often been made explicitly to rational-
ize more development within urban areas. Additional exceptions have been
developed where agribusiness was extensive enough to suggest additional
exceptions to rural rules.
C. Re-Thinking Surface Water Liability in
the Twenty-First Century
Surface water rules carry with them a long history of a particular view
of land—one deeply influenced by the British approach to land manage-
ment, which emerged from contemporaneous agricultural science. Rather
than being re-examined in light of changing times and changing scientific
knowledge, existing doctrines continued unchecked. Now, with our knowl-
edge that drainage generally does not profitably yield arable land, develop-
ment generally means building businesses, roads, and homes, not planting
new fields. Yet, those very different activities are still governed by rules that
originated in the context of sixteenth and seventeenth century agricultural
science. At this point, there is an extensive body of cases that either explic-
itly or implicitly impose a pro-development bias—and particularly one that
encourages drainage—in the process of determining surface water liability.
That bias supports drainage and the destruction of natural wetlands by re-
ducing, if not eliminating, potential liability for ditching, draining, and di-
verting until the land is dry.
The pro-development bias carries with it important implications in the
wetlands context, including the release of stored carbon, the destruction of
natural carbon sequestration devices, and the destruction of wetlands that
otherwise could buffer against storms and mitigate the effects of flooding
and sea level rise. Most importantly, as surface water events become more
frequent through the occurrence of more “super storms,” negative climate
change impacts will continue to worsen if the development bias remains
unchallenged. The natural landscapes that offer us some protection (wet-
lands, salt marshes, and so forth) will be subject to development as usual.
And as more and more lands are developed, climate change itself is likely to
accelerate as a result of the release of carbon and the destruction of natural
carbon sequestration devices, as well as the increase in fossil fuels associated
with the construction of new buildings and new roads.
I hope considering the origins of surface water liability rules and their
role in fostering drainage and development will prompt serious reevaluation
of these rules. Given the long history of jurisprudence in this area, recon-
sideration of the policies supporting the rules of surface water liability will
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likely require statutory changes. Historically, statutes have tended to en-
trench in law rather than challenge the existing jurisprudence. Thus, statu-
tory reform could provide an opportunity for a thorough reexamination of
the politics and policies that support the current rules of surface water lia-
bility. Constituents and legislators could also then consider the climate
change implications of these rules.
This Article provides one option for future legislation. While the many
landscape-specific exceptions have complicated the field and likely made
community understanding of the rules difficult, a single rule of landscape-
specific reasonableness offers important advantages. Such a rule would sup-
port the reasonable expectations of the landowner with respect to develop-
ment, but could also advance the public good through maximizing
sustainability when the most benefit can be gained at the least cost. The
landscape-specific rule I propose would favor development within areas that
were already highly developed, while disfavoring development in landscapes
that remain closer to their natural state.
The point of such a rule would be to maximize economics where there
were relatively few gains to be had from the landscape for climate health,
but then maximize climate health where there were significant potential
impacts to an entirely or largely undeveloped landscape. In already highly
developed landscapes, such as where a tiny quarter acre of wetlands strug-
gles between a McDonald’s and a Wendy’s, protecting the natural landscape
would yield fewer environmental benefits. Not being connected to a larger
network of wetlands, such a parcel would not likely yield significant bene-
fits in terms of mitigating flooding or sea level rise. Such a parcel would
likely suffer from nearby pollutants and would not offer a healthy and ro-
bust ecosystem. Separated from other wetlands, it would not offer the same
diversity of plant and animal life. For those reasons, it would not perform as
effectively as a carbon sequestration device. While there would, of course,
be environmental consequences to draining such a parcel, those conse-
quences would be small when compared to draining a larger and healthier
wetland. In a more highly developed neighborhood, the landowner’s expec-
tations in terms of his right to develop and potential economic return are
significant. A rule that is more open to development in these circumstances
honors the landowner’s expectations with relatively little loss to the public
good.
In contrast, destruction of a larger, more robust wetland with a health-
ier ecosystem would harm the public significantly, both in terms of carbon
sequestration and in terms of mitigating the effects of climate change. As
for the landowner’s expectations, reasonably, he should not anticipate as
much freedom to develop such a parcel. A rule that disfavors development
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA102.txt unknown Seq: 44 23-DEC-15 11:08
116 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 5:1
in this circumstance does little damage to the landowner but maintains sig-
nificant public goods.
Surface water liability rules are not, of course, our only route to pro-
tecting wetlands or to managing land use. There are a variety of avenues for
both goals. Any particular surface water liability case will involve adjudicat-
ing only the rights of the parties to the case. As we have seen, however, the
rules we apply in such cases impact land use more broadly. This is particu-
larly evident in how the courts treat drainage. As is always the case in prop-
erty and tort law, such adjudications also implicate large-scale social issues
that deserve thoughtful attention—attention that has often been paid in
other property and tort contexts.243
CONCLUSION
An increased risk of flooding associated with climate change and urban
development will substantially increase the relevance of surface water rules
and expand the number of pending cases at any given time. If our vision of
the relationship between humans and land has changed, we may have ar-
rived at a critical juncture for changing the rules of surface water. Cur-
rently, our surface water liability rules reflect a continuing influence of
British surface water drainage policy, which evolved from discredited eight-
eenth century agricultural science. These rules encourage development,
thereby accelerating climate change and increasing its impact by further
enabling the destruction of protective natural landscapes.
243. One of the classical examples is Calabresi & Melamed’s investigation of nuisance
law and pollution. While a nuisance suit involves a liability and remedy determination for
two parties, it also implicates much larger questions about how society chooses to manage
the problem of pollution through property and/or tort concepts. Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
